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Abstract 
With the advent of the new violent dissident merger, ‘The IRA/New IRA’, the group 
and its affiliates have had to legitimise their new existence. They have utilised the 
maintenance of paramilitary activity to achieve this. However, they have also 
produced a number of organisational statements, justifying their position, tactics and 
strategies. This article analyses the evolution of these statements, both pre and post-
merger from 2007 to 2015. 126 individual statements and 4 magazines are analysed 
using grounded theory. This analysis found that the statements have a dual strategy, 
aiming to foster trust in the movement and distrust in their perceived enemies. One of 
the dominant ways in which the group aims to foster trust, is by proposing their 
possession of an historical mandate from the republican forefathers of 1916, as well 
as the internally lauded paramilitaries from the Troubles era PIRA. The focus of the 
distrust narrative has been on the ‘constitutional nationalism’ of Sinn Féin. However, 
it also pours scorn on the PSNI, and capitalism, across the island of Ireland. The 
analysis of these statements can provide us with an understanding of the future 
direction of the group, as well as giving us insight, which can inform the development 
of any counter-narrative. 
 
Keywords: IRA, Dissident Republicanism, Statements, Legitimisation, Northern 
Ireland    
  
Fighting	Talk	
	
3	
	
Introduction 
Following extensive consultations, Irish republicans and a number of 
organisations involved in armed actions against the armed forces of the British 
crown have come together within a unified structure, under a single leadership, 
subservient to the constitution of the Irish Republican Army.1 
 
In July 2012 the Real IRA (RIRA) and Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD) 
announced that they had merged.2 Alongside other previously unaligned violent 
dissident republicans (VDR)3 they formed a new group, under the all-encompassing 
title of ‘The IRA.’ In the years since their creation they have posed a ‘severe’ threat to 
the security of Northern Ireland, and Great Britain.4 This merger, often referred to as 
‘The New IRA,’5 was responsible for the murder of prison officer David Black in 
November 2012.6 In the words of the group, Black was killed as a result of the 
perceived ‘torture and degradation’ of dissident republican prisoners, and in ‘direct 
response’ to the growing tensions within Maghaberry jail, the Northern Irish prison 
which houses the majority of VDR detainees.7 Since this murder their paramilitary 
activity has continued to target both national and local victims. This has seen them 
launch a letter and parcel bombing campaign against high profile politicians, police 
officers, MI5 and British army recruitment offices. These have been carried out in 
parallel to the continued day-to-day targeting of Police Service of Northern Ireland 
(PSNI) officers. This is representative of the national strategy of the organisation, 
namely to carry out ‘armed actions against the armed forces of the British crown.’8 It 
lies in parallel with the local strategy, to ‘protect’ the republican communities from 
criminals and other anti-social elements. The manifestation of this can be seen in the 
on-going, and brutal, vigilante violence across Northern Ireland. Kneecappings, 
punishment beatings and assassinations of those labelled as drug dealers have once 
again become the norm.9 These attacks are justified by the IRA as the protection of 
the vulnerable citizens of the republican communities.10 However, their true purpose 
is to gain control, and power, within the communities. It is this control and power that 
can provide the platform on which they launch a more persistent, and violent, national 
strategy.11   
 
As with each of the VDR groups12 the ‘IRA/New IRA’ is aiming to violently mark the 
centenary of the 1916 Easter Rising. Their objective is to establish themselves as the 
Fighting	Talk	
	
4	
	
true heirs to the revolutionaries of 1916. Much of this is demonstrated through their 
paramilitary and terrorist activity. However, the focus of this article is not on their 
violence, it is on their words. With the aim of justifying and legitimising the 
persistence of violence, the group, and their affiliates, has released a number of public 
statements since their inception. This article analyses the overarching purpose of 
these. The analysis of the statements of the ‘IRA/New IRA’ is complimented by a 
similar assessment of the RIRA, RAAD, the Irish Prisoner Welfare Association 
(IRPWA), the ‘Republican Political Prisoners’ in Roe 4 of Maghaberry and the 32 
County Sovereignty Movement (32CSM), the political wing of the RIRA. This 
provides an understanding of the movement as a whole, both pre and post-merger. 
The RIRA, RAAD and a pre-July 2012 32CSM represent the pre-merger 
organisations. By also including their statements it allows for an assessment of the 
evolution of the wider narrative. This is part of a larger project,13 analysing the 
statements of each of the active VDR groups, their prisoners and political wings. This 
is the initial output from the project. Therefore it was deemed appropriate to focus on 
the organisation whose actions indicate that they pose the most significant modern-
day threat to the security of Northern Ireland. 
Terrorist Statements 
As researchers of terrorism we face a variety of methodological difficulties.14 Gaining 
access to valid and reliable data has always been problematic.15 For some there has 
been an over-reliance on historical archival research, with only a small handful of 
field interviews.16 It has been proposed that these methodological difficulties, and a 
dearth of rigour, has led to a ‘stagnation in terrorism research.’ This perceived 
stagnation is said to be as a result of our failure to answer the ‘simple’ question of 
why an individual would turn to the utility of political violence.17 However, if we are 
to make significant advances in our understanding of terrorism, and the terrorist, our 
focus must broaden, in terms of the questions we ask and the methods we use. There 
is more to terrorism research than asking “what leads a person to political 
violence?”18 Likewise there is a range of data sources external from primary sources 
interviews and archival research, available to us. To highlight this fact Alex Schmid 
conceived a list in 2011 of 50 Un- and Under-Researched Topics in the Field of 
(Counter-) Terrorism Studies. One of the topics listed by Schmid was the analysis of 
terrorist statements and internal writings.19   
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It is oft stated that terrorism is a form of communication.20 The violence, targets, 
group names and their chosen symbols all carry a message. They depict what the 
groups stand for, how they wish to proceed and what their end goals may be. The 
terrorists also provide us with a detailed understanding of their motivation, and 
intentions, through their public statements. These statements provide a wealth of 
information for researchers, as they show us how the groups wish to be publicly 
perceived. They provide the public legitimisation for their actions and their continued 
existence. At times they may also deliver a glimpse into the future trajectory of the 
groups. Holbrook’s analysis of the evolution of Al-Qaeda leadership statements 
shows we can gain an insight into the evolution of a terrorist doctrine, and the 
tensions it faces. This research proposed that the discourse of the Al Qaeda leadership 
could be divided in relation to the problem diagnosis, proposed solutions and efforts 
to mobilise their membership and support.21 The understanding gained from the 
statements can resultantly assist us in developing a counter-narrative. This counter-
narrative can be tailored to respond to each of these key themes, in accordance to how 
they are relevant at specific moments in time.22 
 
From the Provisional IRA up to ‘The IRA/New IRA’, modern day republican groups 
have consistently produced statements. These have ranged from the annual Easter and 
New Year statements, to the periodic claims or denials of responsibility. With the 
republican history of fragmentation,23 they also intermittently serve the purpose of 
launching a new faction. This provides the opportunity to justify the necessity, and 
reasoning, for the groups’ newly independent existence. These statements are directed 
at a range of audiences, both internal and external. They simultaneously serve the 
purpose of threatening the perceived enemies, while reassuring the membership and 
support that the movement’s continued existence is both justified and potentially 
fruitful. It is not only the content of these missives, which give us an insight into the 
inner-workings of the organisations. The timing and language24 similarly provides 
important information that can assist us in understanding the leadership’s decision-
making processes, and what they deem to be important to comment on. In her analysis 
of the broad ‘dissident’ discourse Whiting25 analysed the newspapers26 of both the 
32CSM and Republican Sinn Féin (RSF).27 The analysis provides an insight, into how 
the dissident republicans have aimed to legitimise their independent existence. For 
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them it is important to provide a narrative that they are a victimised minority, who 
represent ‘true’ republicanism through a mandate bestowed upon them historically.28 
In their minds they stand apart from their former comrades in Sinn Féin, who have 
abandoned the republican cause. Building on this the present research narrows the 
focus by only analysing one movement within dissident republicanism. However, it 
broadens the focus, by including the statements of the paramilitary, political and 
prisoner wings of this movement. 
The Present Study 
Through the application of grounded theory,29 this study assesses the evolution of the 
‘New IRA/IRA’, and its wider movement’s, narrative and legitimisation. In doing so 
the analysis focuses on the statements of the relevant pre- and post-merger 
paramilitary and political groups. All of the statements analysed are open source. 
They have been accessed through organisational websites, newspapers and 
magazines. While the majority of statements come from internal republican media 
sources, there is a significant minority that appeared in the national and local non-
partisan media. This is especially apparent with the example of RAAD, who 
consistently released statements and interviews through the Derry Journal newspaper.  
 
This analysis focuses on statements from January 1st 2007 to August 31st 2015. The 
start date has been chosen, as this is perceived to be the genesis of the modern-wave 
of VDR activity.30 It was then that Sinn Féin historically declared their support for the 
PSNI, and agreed to sit on the policing board. With this expression of mainstream 
republican policing support, there was a rise in the violent and non-violent activity of 
the VDR groups. This reached a peak in 2010. During this surge in activity the most 
dominant violent groupings were the RIRA and RAAD.31 ‘The IRA/New IRA,’ post-
merger, has similarly echoed their VDR dominance. 
 
Group Name Number of Statements 
Real IRA 22 
32CSM 18 
RAAD 42 
‘The IRA/New IRA’ 15 
Republican Political Prisoners 29 
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Total 126 
Table 1: Number of Individual Statements Analysed by Organisation 
 
As Table 1 shows, 126 individual statements were analysed. This includes 82 pre-
merger and 44 post-merger statements. External from these individual statements was 
the assessment of the first four issues of the IRPWA magazine Scairt Amach.32 This 
magazine, first published in August 2014, contains writings from IRPWA prisoners in 
Maghaberry (Roe 4), Portlaoise (E3/E4) and Hydebank prisons.33 The prisoners in 
these wings, represent the majority of the ‘IRA/New IRA prison population. While 
each issue primarily focuses on prison life, some of the editorials and articles also 
provide an insight into the prisoners’ assessment of external VDR activity. Both sets 
of narratives are considered in the present study.    
 
Throughout the analysis there was one central research question: 
 
1. How does the movement legitimise its continued violent existence? 
 
Guided by this question the analysis went through a multi-stage process. Firstly, each 
statement was analysed individually. Within this stage individual tables were 
developed for each statement. Contained in these were the general themes observed 
line by line in each statement. When the initial analysis of each statement was 
complete, a master table of themes was compiled. These initial themes were then 
grouped together into tables of master themes. This was followed by a return to the 
statements. Accompanied by the tables of themes and master themes, each statement 
was re-analysed to firstly assess whether the initial theme allocated to sections of the 
text accurately represented the sentiment being portrayed. The understanding gained 
from the completion of the first influenced this second stage of analysis. With the 
results of the first stage considered, each statement was analysed to assess whether 
any tacit or layered meaning had been missed. This stage was also used to check the 
validity of the master-themes in comparison to the source data. The final stage of the 
analysis once again saw a return to the original data. This time the analysis focused on 
assessing where the statements were used to attempt to foster trust in the groups, and 
their actions, and where they were used to develop a narrative of distrust in others.34 
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These had been identified as the two predominant purposes of the statements. The 
micro and master themes were also once again validated.     
Analysis 
The analysis found that both pre- and post-merger the process of legitimisation took a 
dual approach. The statements aimed to foster trust in the groups and their actions. 
Parallel to this they aimed to promote a public distrust in the actors, actions and 
concepts that they claimed to be standing apart from or fighting against. They were 
therefore aiming to simultaneously legitimise themselves while delegitimising their 
opposition.  
 
It was observed that the development of trust in the in-group was carried out across 
six micro themes: 
 
1. British Occupation 
2. Historical Mandate 
3. Community Protectors 
4. Promotion of Tactics 
5. Prisoners 
6. Introspection of Dissidence 
 
Parallel to this the process of fostering distrust in the out-groups was carried out over 
a separate three micro themes: 
 
1. PSNI/RUC 
2. Sinn Féin: ‘Constitutional Nationalism’ 
3. The ‘Free State’ Capitalist Establishment 
 
As will be shown across the analysis there was continuous overlap across a number of 
themes. Similar to Holbrook,35 it was observed that the statements could also be 
divided across the headings of problem diagnosis, proposed solutions and efforts to 
mobilise. There are elements of each of these issues across the themes identified here. 
With respect to the problem diagnosis, this is most vivid in the discussion of British 
Occupation, Community Protectors, PSNI, Sinn Féin and the ‘Free State.’ The 
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proposed solutions are primarily witnessed in the discussion of Promotion of Tactics 
and Introspection of Dissidence. The mobilisation of membership and support is 
apparent across all the themes. However, this is most obvious in the invocation of the 
Historical Mandate and the critical analysis of Sinn Féin.   
Trust 
When any organisation, terrorist or otherwise, splits away from their parent group 
they strive to justify their independent existence. They must gain the trust of their 
potential membership and support. The same is expected in relation to organisational 
mergers. The leadership must ‘sell’ the necessity of the new group, and resultantly 
gain the trust of individuals to stay with them. As will be shown in a later section, 
much of this is attempted through the delegitimising of, or garnering of distrust in, the 
out-group(s). However, for the sustained independent existence and growth of the 
organisation, it is imperative that the groups also promote the positives of the in-
group. This is carried out in order to develop and maintain faith, in the organisation’s 
goals, ideals and abilities. Without first of all gaining this trust the organisations are 
always in danger of losing support.  
 
‘British Occupation’ 
The primary legitimisation for any Irish republican group is the British ‘occupation’ 
of Northern Ireland. In light of the politicisation of Sinn Féin, it is imperative that the 
dissidents convince the broader republican population that nothing has changed with 
respect to the British presence in Northern Ireland, and that the need for an armed 
campaign still exists. This depiction is a thread that ties many of the themes together.    
 
The necessity of armed struggle in pursuit of Irish freedom can be avoided 
through the removal of the British military presence in our country, the 
dismantling of their armed militias and the declaration of an internationally 
observed timescale that details the dismantling of British political interference 
in our country.36 
  
From their opening statement, the ‘IRA/New IRA’ contends that the central purpose 
for their continued utility of violence was due to ‘British political interference in 
(their) country.’37 Unsurprisingly, this position was consistent with those of the RIRA 
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and 32CSM prior to their merger with RAAD, and has been retained beyond the 
initial inception of the group. 
 
The IRA remains fully committed to genuine Republican objectives, and where 
Britain denies the Irish people the right to live free from foreign and 
undemocratic interference, the IRA will use military force to assert these rights. 
A failure to do so and failing to support those building a political Republican 
alternative to the status quo would be an abandonment of Republican 
principles.38 
 
Even though the retention of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom provides 
the central mandate for the existence of armed republicanism, this criticism of ‘British 
occupation’ does not take prominence in the narrative. However, this should not be 
considered as the equivalent as a suppressing of import. It is proposed that there is not 
as much concentration on this issue, as by the very definition of the group it is self-
evident that they are opposed to Northern Ireland remaining as part of the United 
Kingdom. By concentrating on this, the group is not establishing any new legitimacy. 
It has been deemed more beneficial for their development to concentrate on other 
new, and sustained, grievances in post-Troubles Northern Ireland. As will be 
demonstrated, this has primarily focused on the perceived roles of the PSNI and Sinn 
Féin in maintaining the partition of Ireland.      
 
Historical Mandate and Prisoners 
As observed by Whiting, the legitimisation for all Irish republican groups comes from 
their utility of their perceived historical mandate.39 They aim to position themselves 
as the true heirs to the forefathers of Irish republicanism. This is most evident in the 
annual pilgrimages to Bodenstown, to commemorate Theobald Wolfe Tone and the 
yearly memorials to mark the anniversaries of the 1916 Easter Rising. These events, 
and the speeches that accompany them, provides each group with the opportunity to 
demonstrate why they believe that they are closest to the revolutionaries who have 
gone before them.  
 
The leadership of the Irish Republican Army remains committed to the full 
realisation of the ideals and principles enshrined in the Proclamation of 1916.40 
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With the approach of the centenary of the 1916 Rising, this historical legitimisation 
has been evident across each republican group, both dissident and mainstream. With 
respect to the ‘The IRA/New IRA’ this was apparent both pre and post-merger, in all 
of the groups with the exception of RAAD. With the announcement of the new 
merger in 2012, this mandate provided the cornerstone for the justification of the new 
group. The groups have publicly stated that they aim to use the unusually high level 
of attention being given to historical republicanism as an opportunity to re-assess their 
strategies and tactics with the hope of re-energising what many believe to be an 
irrelevant campaign.41 For them, this may be considered as a last chance to reignite 
the armed campaign. If they are unable to gain a strengthening of support during the 
commemorations of their most noble forefathers they fear that they may never have as 
fruitful an opportunity again. As will be discussed when analysing the ‘introspection 
of dissidence’ the groups saw the necessity to put forward a strong and united 
dissident front, hence the necessity of the merger. They are therefore not just saying 
that ‘you can trust us because of our historical mandate.’ They are saying that ‘we 
have a historical mandate and we are a united movement.’ 
 
We have proposed that commemorating 1916 should be the annual barometer 
by which we measure our success especially in the run up to its centenary in 
2016. Irish republicanism must be in a position on the occasion of this 
centenary to tell the Irish people that concrete political gains have been made 
toward making national reunification an unstoppable reality. The Proclamation 
is too important a document to condemn it to perpetual aspiration.42 
 
While much of the mandate has been drawn from 1916 this historical legitimisation 
also comes from more recent times. In their minds they are also maintaining the 
armed struggle that many of them fought during The Troubles. They use the deaths 
and sacrifice of the generations past as a tool not just to legitimise themselves to 
external observers but also as an internal reminder to the membership of their place in 
this lineage. Central to this is the reverence in which past and present Irish republican 
prisoners are held. Being able to paint themselves as the heirs to Bobby Sands and his 
fellow hunger strikers now plays as significant a role within their historical 
legitimisation narrative as the memories of Padraig Pearse, Tom Clarke and others. In 
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the eyes of republicans the hunger strikers of 1981 made the ultimate sacrifice for ‘the 
cause.’ They purposefully laid down their lives for the furtherance of their goals. This 
sacrifice is regularly recalled in order to further motivate the resurrection of the armed 
campaign. However, more recently their memories are being employed to draw 
parallels with the modern day campaign. They are being used to raise the arguments 
that thirty-five years of ‘British occupation’ in Northern Ireland still exists and that 
republican prisoners are still in prison campaigning for their political status.  
 
Special mention must be made of the republican POWs in Maghaberry and their 
continued resistance to the torturous prison regime in place there. To those who 
say that the British occupation of Ireland has changed we say why, 30 years 
after 10 brave comrades died in British jails in Ireland, are Irishmen still 
fighting for political status and still being brutalised for doing so?43 
 
In the early 1980s the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin succeeded in mobilising 
significant levels of support, around the hunger-strike campaign. This demonstrated to 
them the levels of potential support that they had, and in turn played a significant role 
in their strategic revision.44 Within the modern wave of VDR activity there has been a 
concerted effort from the groups, to reinvigorate support for their cause through the 
highlighting of the prisoners’ struggle. Their aim is to present the prisoners, and by 
association the wider dissident community, as being victims of an oppressive regime. 
In their minds the victimisation of prisoners and their families gives the continued 
existence of the IRA even greater legitimacy.  
 
Returning to the 2012 murder of prison-officer David Black, it is instructive that they 
used an attack on a prison officer to launch the new group. This demonstrates that 
they portray this as a cause worth fighting for. However, for this to be chosen as a 
high-profile launch of the group, it also demonstrates that they believed that this 
chosen aspect of Irish republicanism was one that could mobilise both membership 
and support. As will be developed in future sections, it has also provided them with an 
opportunity to disparage their former comrades in Sinn Féin, and the wider Catholic 
and nationalist community. This has most recently been emphasised by the prisoners 
themselves and the IRPWA.45 
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The silence of the Catholic Church on this issue is both deafening and 
disgraceful. Politicians who were once Political Prisoners themselves and who 
suffered equal brutality in British Jails should be as vocal about this cruelty as 
they were when their party leader was arrested. A young Irish Republican has 
endured 1500 days of solitary confinement; it is time to let your voices be 
heard.46 
 
Historically, the prisoners have been among the most trusted and revered actors with 
the Irish Republican Movement. They have at times led both the mobilisation of 
recruits and the critical introspection of the armed campaign. The campaigns and 
debate within, and emanating out of, the prisons have played a significant role in 
shaping the strategies and tactics of the Movement.47 It is evident that this is being 
attempted once again. Through their statements and publications the prisoners are not 
just emphasising their own internal issues, they are also passing judgment on the 
external issues surrounding the wider paramilitary and political campaign. They 
acknowledge that the prisoner campaign can give a lift to wider republicanism. 
However, they state that this should only be used as a jump-start for the campaign, 
something to draw the interest in before dealing with the broader issues of ‘British 
Occupation.’ 48  
 
Promotion of Tactics and Community Protectors 
The struggles for freedom and to defend and strengthen our communities are 
intertwined. Whether in the streets of Derry and Belfast, or in the rural 
communities of Armagh and Tyrone, it is these communities from which 
Republican activists have, time and again, derived shelter, support and 
solidarity. 49 
 
While the role the historical mandate of the group can and has been played upon, this 
is not enough to provide a sustained network of membership and support. For any 
terrorist or paramilitary organisation to achieve a significant level of support, they 
need to also demonstrate their ability to oversee a successful and competent modern-
day armed campaign. Much of this comes from the armed actions themselves. 
However, it has been deemed as imperative for the groups to further emphasise their 
capabilities and intentions, through their words. Even though these messages are 
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positioned as internal statements, they are also intended for external audiences. As 
with all terrorist statements they hold a dual purpose, to simultaneously draw support 
and generate fear. The groups have used their claims of responsibility, as well as their 
New Year’s and Easter statements, to promote their tactical capabilities to take the 
armed campaign directly to the British, while also emphasising the value, worth and 
threat of these actions.  
 
Actions by volunteers of Óglaigh na hÉireann in the last year have proved that 
the tactical use of armed struggle can, and does, bring results. As was witnessed 
in Antrim, British soldiers and the colonial police will continue to lose their 
lives as long as the issue of national sovereignty remains unresolved. Óglaigh 
na hÉireann will continue to strike at the British occupation forces wherever 
and whenever we decide.50  
 
They make little to no differentiation between those who they identify as the 
‘occupying force,’ and those assisting them in any way. Both are portrayed as viable 
targets. It is not just those who are assisting in investigations, or providing 
intelligence. It represents those who are providing any service, no matter how 
insignificant they may seem. One of the most striking examples of this can be seen in 
the shooting of the pizza-delivery man, who was shot during the Massereene Barracks 
attack in 2009. The justification of this is similar to the specific targeting of Catholic 
and Nationalist PSNI officers, an issue discussed later.  
 
We also reserve the right to execute anyone providing services, in any shape or 
form, to the enemy. Those who assist the occupiers have placed themselves in 
harm's way. They know what they need to do to extricate themselves from a 
situation of their own making. There will be no further warnings.51 
 
These statements are developed in order to promote the groups as fighting against the 
British occupation of Ireland, through their disruption of the normalisation of politics. 
However, both pre and post-merger the paramilitary forces have similarly focused to a 
large extent on their complimentary role as community protectors. This dual focus 
demonstrates the parallel local and national strategies of the group. Throughout their 
history the IRA in its many guises has promoted itself as the only legitimate guardian 
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of the Irish republican communities. In their minds the PSNI, and their predecessors 
in the RUC, are unrepresentative forces that have neither the ability nor the right to 
police the republican communities of Northern Ireland. The self-assigned role as 
community protector has historically been used by paramilitaries, to gain power and 
control within the communities. This has in turn been used to justify a campaign of 
punishment beatings, kneecappings and assassinations of those deemed to be 
criminals and/or anti-social influences on the communities.52  
 
This role as community protector is most notable when one analyses the statements 
and actions of RAAD. In their pre-merger existence it was their sole stated aim to 
drive drug dealing out of the republican communities in Derry and north Donegal. Of 
all the groups analysed here, RAAD demonstrated more than any other the faith they 
placed in the power of statements. Throughout their violent existence they regularly 
gave interviews and released statements to their local newspaper the Derry Journal. 
They did this to promote the threat they posed and their justification for it. However, 
throughout their short but vocal existence they promoted themselves simply as 
protectors of the communities. They stated that they had no national political agenda. 
 
Our only aim is to eliminate drug dealers from our society and put an end to 
them destroying our community. Our only concern is to end the threat posed by 
the supply of both illegal and prescription drugs, a threat which has already 
claimed the lives of a number of young people, ruined other lives and torn many 
families apart. There is no political agenda whatsoever within our 
organization.53 
 
While RAAD is no longer in existence as an independent entity, their tactics are still 
employed by ‘The IRA/New IRA.’ The statements and interviews in relation to 
paramilitary vigilantism are not as frequent. But when they do emerge they are 
carrying the same message. This is most clearly emphasised in a 2013 statement, 
claiming responsibility for the murder of suspected drug dealer Kevin Kearney. The 
paramilitaries’ claim was used to legitimise the murder, as well as their wider 
vigilante strategy. They stated that the attack on Kearney was to protect the young 
people of the community from the dangers of drug addiction.54 
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As a direct result of Kearney's drug dealing many of our young people have 
developed drug addictions, and some have lost there [sic] lives. The IRA will 
not allow this to continue. 
 
The overall purpose here is to gain trust within the communities, that they are 
protecting them in a way that no one else is. This trust is essential if these groups are 
to survive, let alone succeed. However, with the recent proliferation of the VDR 
prisoner statements, the employment of vigilantism to achieve this aim has been 
called into question. In the Summer 2015 issue of Scairt Amach, the anonymous 
author questioned the maintenance of paramilitary vigilantism. While they did not 
bring into question the legitimacy of the tactic, they did question its true effect. For 
them its continuation may be counter-productive, in the development and 
maintenance of support. They question whether it may actually be driving support 
away, rather than strengthening it.55  
 
The division and discord which punishment attacks can engender within 
Republican communities, whether by accident or design, can sometimes further 
British crown forces’ counterinsurgency policies. Our young people in 
particular can be alienated as a result of an action which ironically was 
originally intended to protect the community of which youth are so crucial a 
part. 56 
 
This critical sentiment of punishment attacks has only been observed in one statement 
or article during the period of analysis, from 2007 to August 2015. However, in the 
first issue of Scairt Amach in a post-analysis period, in the August 2015 edition, the 
tactic was once again called into question.57 This is a debate, which must be watched 
closely to assess its development. As was intimated in the previous section, the 
prisoner community has a history of leading the critical analysis of the wider 
republican strategy. It is only with this internal debate, that an organisation can truly 
move away from long-fostered strategies. By opening up the debate on the utility of 
punishment attacks, the prisoners are providing a platform on which a distancing from 
punishment beatings and other forms of vigilante violence could be a possibility. This 
is reminiscent of the ‘Brownie Letters,’ that appeared in the Belfast based newspaper 
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Republican News the 1970s. These were prisoners’ letters, widely believed to be 
written by Gerry Adams, which actively questioned the external strategies of the 
Provisional Movement in relation to the policy of abstentionism, amongst other 
issues.58 With the presumed nobility of the prisoners, they are often the most trusted 
people within republicanism, and therefore can have more clout than others whilst 
questioning the direction of the movement. 
 
Introspection of Dissidence 
Óglaigh na hÉireann call for a realignment of the Republican forces around the 
defence of the Republican position. For too long we have allowed ourselves to 
be fragmented, marginalised and isolated. This has provided succour to our 
enemies and has allowed our position to be portrayed as weak.59 
 
To date the analysis has demonstrated that the aims of the statements have been on 
legitimising the retained utility of paramilitary violence, in the pursuit of a united 
Ireland. This is accompanied by an active delegitimisation campaign, against a range 
of external actors and entities. The primary purpose of the legitimisation campaign is 
to develop and maintain the trust of their membership and support. One of the most 
dominant ways they have sought to do this, both pre- and post-merger, has been 
through the introspection of their own tactics and strategies. This was already alluded 
to above, in the discussion of the utility of punishment beatings. However, the 
introspection has been much broader than this. Through the process, they are 
admitting to strategic mistakes of the past and are inviting trust in them to bring about 
the necessary changes. 
 
Irish republicanism is a traditionally splintered movement.60 Splits have formed for a 
variety of reasons, some political, others strategic and many personal. However, the 
modern-day incarnation of republicanism has seen one dominant force, that of Sinn 
Féin and the remnants of the Provisional IRA. Those dissidents in opposition to them 
are small in number, yet have retained their fragmentation. In the lead-up to the 2012 
merger, it was this fragmentation that was repeatedly presented by the RIRA and 
32CSM as suppressing any possibility of dissident success.61 In their Easter and New 
Year statements, both groups continuously emphasised the importance of presenting a 
united dissident movement. From the start of the modern-wave of VDR actor activity, 
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and even prior to that, the RIRA presented this as the key objective for the movement. 
One could argue that they were attempting to delegitimise the organisational make-up 
of dissident republicanism.  
 
In their calls for unity, they put forward their opinion that without unity they were 
providing ‘succour’ for their enemies.62 This reference to their ‘enemies’ could be 
considered as referring not just to the British but also to their former comrades in Sinn 
Féin.  
 
In order to combat the forces of repression and partition republicans must think 
strategically and pragmatically. Republican unity must remain a key objective 
and aspiration for all republicans, for our part the IRA have worked closely 
with other organisations in every way and we will do so in the future. A united 
republican base is much more able to withstand the onslaught of the united 
forces of occupation.63 
 
With these consistent calls for unity the dissident merger should not have come as a 
surprise when it finally arrived in 2012. In the aftermath of the split, the new 
organisation has not actively referred to the pre-merger organisations. They are just 
promoting their unity as a movement. However, even since 2012 violent dissident 
republicanism is far from a united front. The ‘The IRA/New IRA’ has now become 
the dominant VDR group, yet they are not the only ones claiming the moniker of The 
IRA. Still active are ONH and multiple factions of CIRA. Resultantly the calls for 
unity have not dissipated post-2012. However, individual dissidents and the prisoners 
have most recently taken up the mantle. This is most clearly demonstrated in the 
former RIRA prisoner Gary Donnelly’s 2015 Easter oration, that he gave at an 
independent commemoration in Derry City. In this he openly criticised Irish 
republicans, for failing to realise the ideals of the 1916 Rising. 
 
Irish republicanism must abandon its obsession with parochial control and 
adopt with urgency a national concept of winning this struggle. As it stands, on 
the precipice of the Centenary of the 1916 Rising, republicans are united in 
failure…No matter which monument you stand at in 2016, no matter which 
banner or flag you gather under, the answer to the sole question emanating 
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from our patriot graves, as to whether the ideals of the Proclamation are yet 
realised, the collective answer will be a resounding no.64 
 
The introspection has not purely been about republican disunity and punishment 
attacks. Recent statements have also called into question the overall delegitimising 
strategy, directed against the ‘constitutional nationalism’ of Sinn Féin. They are 
saying that it is no longer enough to be criticising others. If they are doing this, they 
must also be providing a viable and credible alternative.65 It is not sufficient to have 
the maintenance of armed conflict as their ‘peak aspiration.’ This must not be all that 
differentiates them from mainstream republicanism. 
 
The statement that ‘to fight is to win’ shouldn’t form the peak of aspiration for 
those who see revolution as their goal. All of those who dedicated and gave 
their lives to Irish freedom deserve respect and admiration; however, we cannot 
simply seek to replicate historic actions which, in the end, fell short of our final 
goal. 
 
These statements of introspection play a number of roles. They are attempting to 
generate a message convincing membership and support, both existing and potential, 
that the groups can be trusted. They are saying that, unlike Sinn Féin, the dissidents 
are listening. These groups wish to portray that they understand the widespread 
discontent about the perpetual fragmentation and the utility of violence for violence’s 
sake. They say that they have learned from the mistakes of the past and that their 
strategic focus will achieve republican goals, without having to pass the armed 
struggle on to the future generations.66 In providing these messages they are trying to 
obtain, and maintain, a dwindling support. They know that without this support, both 
passive and active, that any hope of survival, let alone ‘success,’ is impossible.        
 
Distrust  
In order to justify the necessity of their independent existence, the groups have 
continuously fostered the strategy of delegitimising their opposition. This has 
primarily focused on developing and fostering distrust in the PSNI and Sinn Féin. 
However, it also has seen the attempted delegitimisation of the capitalist 
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establishment across the island of Ireland. By focusing on the negative aspects of 
others, often more willingly than their own supposed positives, they are reaffirming 
their perceived necessity as a movement of protest. This is primarily aimed to 
function as a tool, to both recruit and maintain the existing membership and support.  
 
‘PSNI/RUC’ 
What we witness today is British Auxiliary police targeting those opposed to 
British rule in Ireland...Their mask has slipped and they are proving to be no 
different than the reviled RUC. This is political policing.67 
 
One of the primary goals of these organisational statements has been the 
condemnation and the attempted delegitimising of the PSNI. Both the paramilitary 
and political wings constantly equate the new police force, established in 2001, with 
their predecessors in the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). In their presentation of 
the force, they are depicting them as upholding the British occupation of Northern 
Ireland. The aim of this is once again to portray that nothing has changed, since the 
advent of the peace process. This narrative has become particularly strong in the 
aftermath of Sinn Féin’s decision to acknowledge the legitimacy of the PSNI in 
January 2007.  
 
Their role is further ‘legitimised’ and enhanced by support from organisations 
and bodies…with historic links to Republicanism. However, an objective 
examination of the PSNI would reveal, similar to the RUC, an extensive 
paramilitary element comprised of branches which are deployed in specific 
instances, keeping them from public view and thus disguising the true nature of 
the entire force. 68 
 
During the Troubles, the focus of such statements was not just on the police, but also 
on the British military’s presence in Northern Ireland. However, with British soldiers 
no longer patrolling the streets of Northern Ireland the PSNI, and more recently MI5, 
have been the primary focus of this delegitimising narrative. This has been 
continuously utilised to justify the political opposition to, as well as the paramilitary 
targeting of, the force. The police are portrayed as the physical manifestation of 
British occupation, and are therefore the most visible ‘enemy’ for the dissidents to 
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fight against. It is this visibility of an enemy, which is used to legitimise the 
continuation of violence.  
 
By repeatedly equating them as equivalent to the RUC, they are painting the PSNI as 
being a purely Protestant police force whose role is to protect the Unionist population 
of Northern Ireland. The aim to maintain the alleged illegitimacy of the PSNI, due to 
this perceived unrepresentativeness, has therefore been a central aim of the groups. 
This has been seen through their statements, and their targeting of the police. As a 
result the group has specifically targeted Catholic and nationalist police officers, such 
as Ronan Kerr. These officers are being portrayed as ‘traitors’ to their communities. 
The intention of this tactic has been to deter others, of a similar background, from 
joining the police. More broadly the aim is to delegitimise the authority of the PSNI, 
within the republican communities of Northern Ireland. It is only through this 
delegitimising of the force, that they can have any success in legitimising the 
necessity of their own perceived roles as ‘community protectors.’69 
 
It is irrelevant what religion the person is who wears the uniform of this force, 
when they are kicking in a door and arresting a father, brother, son, mother, 
sister or daughter it is the uniform of British policing in Ireland that is behind 
it.70 
 
The statements continuously call into question the motives and actions of the PSNI. 
They attempt to transfer any blame for injuries caused from their attacks onto the 
police. Both the ‘IRA/New IRA,’ and their predecessors in the RIRA, have accused 
the police of applying calculated inaction with the aim of injuring civilians. They 
propose that the aim of this is to allow for death and injury, in order to discredit those 
who planted any bombs or carried out attacks. This is an attempt to say that it is the 
police, and not the paramilitaries, who are putting civilians at risk.      
 
These so called modern day heroes were brave enough to allow hundreds of 
non-combatants to pass a large IRA bomb in Newry, we do not believe that this 
was sheer incompetence of their behalf but a calculated action aimed at putting 
civilians in the danger zone to protect themselves and discredit republicans.71 
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The delegitimisation of the PSNI is heavily linked to the attempted legitimisation of 
the ‘IRA/New IRA’, and their paramilitary predecessors, as community protectors. It 
is only when the group successfully delegitimises the PSNI that they will have an 
opportunity to be accepted as their alternative. In order to achieve this, both the 
paramilitary and political groups repeatedly promote the idea that the PSNI 
purposefully ‘abandoned’ the Catholic areas of Northern Ireland.72 This is elaborated 
upon by accusing the force of exploiting members of the communities, to assist them 
in their work. Resultantly the permanent threat posed towards the police is mirrored in 
the threat posed towards those accused of assisting them. The purpose of this is to 
portray the belief that the paramilitaries are not just fighting against the forces of the 
state, but that informers from within their own communities also threaten them. As 
discussed earlier, thus providing further justification for their targeting of the very 
communities they claim to represent.  
 
Óglaigh na hÉireann advise political and community leaders to desist from the 
practice of assisting, and urging others to assist the RUC/PSNI, those who do 
so are clearly making the choice to align themselves with the enemy. The 
repercussions of assisting the enemy are clear and those who do so bear full 
responsibility for any action that may be taken against them.73 
 
 
Sinn Féin: ‘Constitutional Nationalists’ 
The aim across all of these statements is to insure the relevance of the group, and their 
armed campaign. Across each of the themes, they claim the peace process to have 
failed with no significant positive political changes. The majority of blame for this 
has been directed at their former comrades in Sinn Féin. They are depicted as having 
abandoning their republican principles, in exchange for ‘constitutional nationalism.’ 
Through their political engagement in Stormont and beyond they are described as 
being active servants of the British state. This in turn is utilised as a contrast to the 
dissidents’ own retention of the armed campaign. 
 
The IRA has played its part in recent years by rebuilding, rearming and 
refocusing efforts to build a sustainable military campaign…At the same time 
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Constitutional Nationalists and former Republicans that abandoned the IRA 
oath and constitution, dine with British royals and implement British rule.74 
 
Across each of the existing themes the dissidents aim to differentiate themselves from 
Sinn Féin. On a national level, their key condemnation of Sinn Féin is that their 
politicisation has brought a united Ireland in no way closer.  
 
In recent years the establishment of a free and independent Ireland has suffered 
setbacks due to the failure among the leadership of Irish nationalism and 
fractures within republicanism. The root cause of conflict in our country is the 
subversion of the nation's inalienable right to self-determination and this has 
yet to be addressed. Instead the Irish people have been sold a phony peace, 
rubber-stamped by a token legislature in Stormont.75 
 
On a local level, they assert that the party no longer protect, represent or care for the 
working-class republican populations of Ireland.76 In relation to the prisoners, they 
blame Sinn Féin for the ‘inflicting this degradation on republican prisoners.’77 The 
overarching message they wish to put forward is that British occupation is 
strengthened by modern day Sinn Féin. They assert that in a post-peace process 
Northern Ireland that Sinn Féin has stifled any internal debate in republicanism. It is 
their opinion that this has led to the criminalisation of dissidence. 
 
Óglaigh na hÉireann condemn the attempts by former comrades to intimidate 
and silence debate among Republicans on the policing issue and we further 
view their attempts to portray themselves as victims of Republican threats for 
what they are, an attempt to distract their own base from the inevitability of 
their eventual capitulation to British and Unionist preconditions.78 
 
They depict Sinn Féin as having abandoned any historical mandate they may have 
once had, in exchange for political power. They take their seats in a British 
parliament, support a British police force operating in Ireland, and dine and shake 
hands with a British monarch. This political engagement with Britain now provides 
greater credence to the dissident notion of historical legitimisation. In their eyes they 
are the only ones left carrying the torch.  
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History has shown us that compromise with the British on the issue of national 
sovereignty has always resulted in those who have compromised condemning 
those who continue to uphold and defend Irish sovereignty. 79 
        
If the ‘IRA/New IRA’ is to have any chance of surviving, let alone succeeding, they 
are aware that it is imperative that they differentiate themselves from the republican 
alternative in Sinn Féin. Without this differentiation from mainstream republicanism, 
their claims will continue to fall on deaf ears. For the most part the content of the 
modern day dissident statements is indistinguishable from those of the former 
Provisional comrades, who they now castigate. This is a very deliberate strategy. It is 
to reflect that recurring theme that nothing has changed since the peace process, that 
the political process has not brought the advent of a united Ireland any closer. This is 
to emphasize that the rationale for armed action throughout the Troubles, still exists 
today. The key difference with the modern day justification is that now the 
politicisation of Provisional republicanism is regarded as further justification of 
sustained armed action. This is reflective of the Provisional condemnation of the 
politicising Official IRA in the early 1970s.80 
 
When legitimising their own activity, the dissidents do not miss an opportunity to 
condemn the policies and actions of the Provisionals. In doing so they are attempting 
to extoll their own republican purity. For them it is an irrelevance that the vast 
majority of the republican community has long ago distanced themselves from the 
utility of force. In fact, they attempt to present this as a positive. They wear their 
lonesome adherence to armed activity as a badge of honour.       
 
A resurgent republicanism will demonstrate to both governments and the 
international community that the destruction of the Provisional movement was 
the liberation of Irish republicanism.81 
 
While the fostering of distrust in Sinn Féin is dominant across their narrative, it will 
be worthwhile to monitor whether this is retained in the coming years. Recalling the 
‘introspection of dissidence,’ there is now a widening call for the groups to be 
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focusing less on the negative aspects of their republican opposition and more on their 
own internal critique. 
 
The ‘Free-State’ Capitalist Establishment 
The disdain towards ‘British occupation,’ the PSNI and Sinn Féin is well 
documented. However, what is not as regularly acknowledged is the dissident 
opposition to both the Republic of Ireland and capitalism. In their statements the 
groups regularly refer derogatorily to the ‘Free State,’82 or the 26 counties. For them 
the existence of the Republic of Ireland, alongside the attitude and actions of its 
politicians, continues to promote the partition of the island of Ireland.  
 
The VDR statements depict an Irish state, actively assisting the British by ‘interning’ 
dissident republicans. As with the Catholic and nationalist PSNI officers, they are 
equally seen as being traitors to Ireland. However, the condemnation of the Republic 
does not just stop with its politicians. It is claimed that other members of the ‘Free 
State establishment,’ namely the media and the Catholic Church, assist in these 
attacks on dissidents. The claims are repeated time and again, that the media present 
lies about the dissidents so as to support the government’s policies.83 This is an 
attempt to further emphasise the perception of dissident victimisation. The narrative 
aims to develop a distrust of the institutions, north and south of the border, which 
condemn the retention of paramilitary activity.  
 
This past year has also saw republicanism under a level of attack from the 
Church, State and Media that has not been witnessed for many years... Again 
the Catholic Church has entered the fray on the side of capitalism, conservatism 
and the status quo, this is to be expected. We would advise the church to clean 
up their own back yard before commenting on others. They should take the 
plank out of their own eyes before worrying themselves about the splinters in 
others. It is perhaps a small mercy that the church is no longer a major player 
in forming opinions in Irish society.84 
     
Due to the recent downturn in the Irish economy, this critique has been accentuated 
by what the groups portray as the ills of capitalism. The Irish recession has led to the 
necessity for the country to be bailed out, and extreme national budgetary measures to 
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be taken. Through their actions and statements, the dissidents have attempted to 
capitalise on the resultant discontent and anger. This led to a number of attacks on 
financial institutions by the pre-merger RIRA. They justified this by claiming that it 
was to demonstrate that “while the Irish national and class struggles are distinct, they 
are not separate.”85 This disdain for the ‘capitalist establishment’ has also seen them 
piggyback on a number of burgeoning protest movements across Ireland, most 
notably the anti-austerity and anti-water charge movements. They claim that these 
actions are to fight for the working class people of Ireland who have been abandoned 
by both the state and Sinn Féin.86 They claim that their aim is not just to achieve a 
united Ireland, but a united socialist Ireland.  
 
The occupation of the six counties by an Imperialist power is mirrored now in 
the 26 counties by an administration that is directed by the IMF. The power 
wielded by both imperialism and capitalism in Ireland is an impediment to the 
Republic envisioned by Connolly, Lalor, Pearse and Tone. 87 
 
While analysts regularly ignore these dissident criticisms of capitalism, they play a 
dominant role in the VDR narrative. It provides them with an opportunity to expand 
their appeal, beyond the traditional republican communities and into left-wing anti-
capitalist populations. At a time of protest, both nationally and internationally, this 
may be seen as a cynical attempt to associate their movement with this rising tide of 
discontent.    
Conclusion 
If the ‘IRA/New IRA,’ and their affiliates, are to have any success in maintaining, or 
even intensifying, their paramilitary campaign it is vital that they build on their 
depleted support base. The statements analysed here play a key role in the 
development of this. Through their publication, the groups are attempting to foster 
trust in their existence, tactics and strategies, while simultaneously fostering distrust 
in those they define as their enemies. The assessment of these statements provides us 
with an opportunity to understand how the groups aim to develop. The insight gained 
can also assist any development of a counter-narrative, to deter engagement with 
these groups, and their armed action. These counter-narratives must be carefully 
designed and delivered, with a key understanding of the internal debate within the 
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groups themselves. There must be an awareness of the importance not only of the 
message, but its delivery. If it is to be effective, it must be delivered through a 
medium that the intended audience both trusts and respects. One would expect that 
these trusted voices would not come from ‘mainstream’ republicanism. It is more 
likely that the trusted counter-narratives to VDR activity will come from the non-
violent dissident republicans. It will not be their role to counter the narrative of 
dissent. What needs to be countered is the manifestation of this dissent in violence.  
 
These VDR statements provide us with an opportunity to predict the next steps of the 
groups, and therefore allow us to prepare for these eventualities. This is most noted 
with respect to the merger itself. As was demonstrated when discussing the 
‘introspection of dissidence’ the statements of the RIRA and 32CSM were pointing to 
the possibility of a merger, a number of years prior to its eventual manifestation in 
2012. Throughout their statements the groups are continuously pointing out their 
intended strategies, tactics and targets. This should inform counter-paramilitary 
strategies both, locally and nationally. It can also direct us towards understanding the 
internal debates within the movement and therefore prepare us for any future strategic 
or tactical shifts, either positive or negative. 
 
The analysis of the messages portrayed in the statements should only be considered as 
the first step. In order to achieve a better understanding, it is imperative to also assess 
their effect on internal and external audiences. Future analysis should find 
methodologically rigorous, and ethical, ways of assessing the power of these 
statements. This research should question whether the battery of statements has any 
effect in informing, or shaping, people’s opinions and actions. This research should 
question whether the statements succeed in generating trust in the ‘IRA/New IRA,’ 
and distrust in their opposition. Their effectiveness, or lack thereof, should never be 
taken for granted.  
 
This research project will expand to include an analysis of the public narratives of the 
wider VDR community. This will include analysis of the statements of CIRA, ONH 
and their relevant partners. In order to gain the most complete understanding of the 
republican narrative this will all then be compared with the equivalent statements of 
Sinn Féin. This future analysis will take into account VDR statements pre-2007. This 
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will allow the assessment of whether the rhetoric of the groups had changed 
significantly in the aftermath of Sinn Féin’s support of the PSNI. 
The island of Ireland is in the midst of a decade of centenaries.88 It is clear, that the 
VDR groups aim to take advantage of this time of remembrance, in order to legitimise 
their armed existence. Theirs is not a threat, which will dissipate with the passing of 
2016. Their statements and actions indicate that they are here to stay. While they do 
not pose the persistent danger of their Provisional predecessors, they possess the 
intention and ability to both maim and disrupt. Academics and practitioners alike 
must not lose sight of this, and must continue in their endeavour to both understand 
and counter the threat.  
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